After the first days at the Munich workshop it has become clear to me that nobody here has practical advice for how to move on. Maybe I was expecting too much of the philosophers. What I learn, however, is that Karl Popper’s idea that scientific theories must be falsifiable has long been an outdated philosophy. I am glad to hear this, as it’s a philosophy that nobody in science ever could have used, other than as a rhetorical device. It is rarely possible to actually falsify an idea, since ideas can always be modified or extended to match incoming evidence. Rather than falsifying theories, therefore, we “implausify” them: a continuously adapted theory becomes increasingly difficult and arcane—not to say ugly—and eventually practitioners lose interest. How much it takes to implausify an idea, however, depends on one’s tolerance for repeatedly making a theory fit conflicting evidence. — 51: 709-715
Not only is quantum mechanics itself weird, the research area is too. In particle physics we have theory, experiment, and, in the middle between them, phenomenology. Phenomenologists are the ones who (like Gordy Kane) coax predictions out of theories, usually by simplifying the math and figuring out what can be measured, to which precision, and how (and, not rarely, also by whom). In other areas of physics, researchers don’t assort into these three categories as clearly as they do in particle physics. But — 147: 2097-2101
“It goes back to this book by Richard Dawid, who started his career in physics but then turned to philosophy.” According to Richard, I explain, it is rational of string theorists to take into account all available information, including mathematical properties, to evaluate their theory. “But what’s the point of such a theory if it doesn’t explain anything?” Frank asks. “Richard is silent on this issue.” “Well, let me put it this way. If there was any bit of experimental evidence that was decisive and in favor of the theory, you wouldn’t be hearing these arguments. You wouldn’t. Nobody would care. It’s just a fallback. It’s giving up and declaring victory. I don’t like that at all.” Yes, I think, the discussion about post-empirical arguments was brought on by lack of empirical arguments. But simply knowing that doesn’t move us forward. — 167: 2384-2391
“If the laws weren’t beautiful, we wouldn’t have found them,” Frank said. That’s exactly what worries me. I’d rather have an ugly explanation than no explanation at all, but if he’s correct, we might never find a more fundamental theory if it ain’t beautiful enough. — 171: 2456-2458
And so I tell Katie that, yes, I think nature has more beauty in store for us. But beauty, like happiness, can’t be found by complaining about its absence. — 233: 3343-3344